We study the efficient allocation of a divisible asset when reallocation is costly. Each of two players is initially allocated a share of the asset. At the time of this initial division the players' valuations for the asset are uncertain. After the uncertainty resolves, costly reallocation may take place. Reallocation costs may depend on the amount reallocated and on players' valuations. We first observe that contracting on the initial division and the reallocation enables the players to attain the highest possible expected surplus for the specified initial division. Our main result then establishes that this maximal expected surplus either monotonically increases or monotonically decreases in the concentration of the initial division for a wide range of reallocation cost specifications. * We thank
Introduction
Assets such as labor and capital are often allocated when there is uncertainty about their best use. And reallocating such assets after the uncertainty resolves -to increase the benefit they generate -is typically costly. Anticipating this cost, how should an asset be initially allocated?
This question arises in the context of professional partnerships. For example, when partners in a law firm begin to handle the cases of a new client, they may face uncertainty about each partner's fit with the client's needs. And reallocating cases later on to the partner with the better fit is costly because it requires that partner to learn what the other partners did with their cases. Anticipating this cost, how should the partners initially divide the new client's cases?
A similar dilemma arises in the context of inheritance planning. When parents draft a will to bequeath a family business or other assets to their children, they (and their children) may not know how much each child will value each asset at the time of the will's execution. Being concerned that any future reallocation of the assets may cause an emotional loss to the children whose shares in a particular asset decrease, how should the parents design their will?
Another relevant context is joint ventures. When two firms contract to build a plant that manufactures a widget used in the production of each firm's final product, they are often uncertain about their own demand for the plant's output. And any future redistribution of this output may involve costly adjustments to each firm's supply chain. How then should the firms initially divide the portion of the output they may wish to reallocate later?
These examples illustrate that reallocation costs are ubiquitous and, moreover, that the structure of these costs depends on the setting being considered. In the joint venture setting, the reallocation costs may be thought of as convex in the amount reallocated. This is because firms may have the flexibility to first make the least costly adjustments to their supply chain. But such flexibility may not be available in the context of learning legal cases. If the cases are roughly homogenous and learning amounts to understanding how the other partner handled them, then the cost of learning an additional case decreases in the number of cases that have already been learned, so the reallocation costs are concave. Similarly, in the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky's (1991) model of reference-dependent preferences, the marginal sensitivity to emotional losses decreases in the size of the loss, so the reallocation costs in the inheritance planning example are concave. Of course, reallocation costs may also involve an overhead that is independent of the amount reallocated.
The goal of this paper is to study how reallocation costs affect the optimal initial division of assets in multi-player environments with aggregate initial uncertainty. We establish that if reallocation costs involve a significant overhead that is independent of the amount reallocated, the players will optimally choose as concentrated an initial division of the asset as possible. This continues to hold if costs are concave in the amount reallocated. Thus, when reallocation involves a significant learning component, as may be the case when reassigning workload in professional partnerships, a single partner should handle most of the workload associated with a particular client. Similarly, when reallocation involves emotional losses, as may be the case when reassigning ownership of family assets, the initial ownership of each asset should be concentrated in the hands of a single child (equality can be preserved by allocating additional monetary assets). In contrast, we establish that if reallocation costs are convex in the amount reallocated, as may be the case when reallocating output in the joint venture setting, firms will optimally choose as equal an initial division as possible.
We study a two-stage model in which two symmetric risk-neutral players with quasi-linear utilities wish to allocate between them a divisible asset. At the beginning of stage 0, the players sign a contract that specifies the initial division of the asset, its final allocation, and transfers. The initial division is then carried out, when players' valuations for the asset are still uncertain. 1 Between stage 0 and stage 1 players' valuations are realized, either publicly or privately. In stage 1, players report their valuations and the final allocation is implemented.
When the final allocation differs from the initial division, the players incur reallocation costs. These costs arise because something in the asset, the players or the environment changes after the asset is initially allocated, as in the examples above. 2 The reallocation costs may depend on players' valuations for the asset and on the amount reallocated. For example, the emotional loss associated with losing ownership of an asset may depend on the individual's valuation for the asset and on the size of the loss. Because contracting takes place when players have no private information or property rights, they will specify in the contract a final allocation that maximizes the sum of their expected utilities -or the expected surplus -relative to the initial division. If valuations are realized privately, this requires that each player's share of the reallocation costs satisfy an appropriate increasing differences condition. Our analysis thus focuses on how the initial division specified in the contract affects the maximal expected surplus.
Our main results establish that the maximal expected surplus is monotonic in the initial concentration, which is the larger share in the initial division. We first show that when the reallocation cost function is insensitive to the amount reallocated or concave in the amount reallocated, the maximal expected surplus is constant when the initial concentration is smaller than some threshold, and is then strictly increasing in the initial concentration. We then show that when the reallocation cost function is convex in the amount reallocated, the maximal expected surplus is still constant when the initial concentration is small enough, but is then strictly decreasing in the initial concentration. These results hold regardless of how valuations are distributed and how they affect the reallocation costs. These parameters only influence the threshold above which the monotonicity becomes strict.
As an illustration, consider the simplest case of constant reallocation costs. In this case, for any realization of players' valuations it is efficient either to reallocate the entire asset to the player with the higher valuation or to maintain the initial division. Suppose that player 1 has the larger initial share. Then, in an efficient final allocation the likelihood of maintaining the initial division is larger when player 1 has the higher valuation than when player 2 does. This is because the benefit of reallocating the asset to a player decreases in the player's initial share. Now consider increasing player 1's initial share slightly. This does not affect the surplus when the asset is reallocated to one of the players, because the reallocation costs are constant. But it does change the surplus when the initial division is maintained: the surplus increases when player 1's valuation is higher, and decreases when player 2's valuation is higher. The net effect is positive because, as indicated above, it is more likely that player 1's valuation is higher when the initial division is maintained. Optimizing the final allocation for the more concentrated initial division further increases the expected surplus.
Our monotonicity results have several implications. The first relates to cases in which players can specify any initial division at the contracting stage. In such cases, they will specify a fully concentrated initial division when reallocation costs are amount insensitive or concave, and an equal one when reallocation costs are convex. The second implication relates to cases in which players are constrained in choosing the initial division in the contract, e.g., when learning one's valuation for the asset requires a minimal initial share or when players have time or other constraints that are likely to be resolved before valuations are realized. In such cases, players will choose as concentrated an initial division as possible when reallocation costs are amount insensitive or concave and as equal an initial division as possible when reallocation costs are convex.
The third implication relates to cases in which the cost structure involves an amountinsensitive component and a convex variable component. In such cases, the amount-insensitive component pushes toward a more concentrated initial division and the convex variable component pushes toward a less concentrated initial division. We show that when one component is "sufficiently dominant," the optimal initial division is still the equal division or a fully concentrated one. We also provide an example in which neither component dominates and the optimal initial division is neither the equal division nor a fully concentrated one.
The forces that underlie our monotonicity results do not rely on the two-player or symmetry assumptions. We show that asymmetries in players' valuations or reallocation costs tilt the optimal initial division toward the player with the ex-ante higher valuation or lower cost. We also generalize the notion of concentration and show that the monotonicity results continue to hold when there are more than two players.
There are, of course, other factors we do not consider that affect the optimal allocation of an asset. One such factor is investments to improve the asset that take place after it is initially allocated. When these investments are non-contractible, the allocation of the asset affects players' investment incentives and hence the surplus from the asset. How to optimally allocate assets in such settings is the focus of the property rights literature pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) . Clearly, there are important settings in which noncontractible investments are a dominant factor. There are other settings in which investments play a smaller role, as may be the case in inheritance planning, or are contractible, as may be the case in some joint ventures. There are also settings in which both investments and costly reallocation are present. In such settings, we expect both factors to jointly determine the optimal initial division.
Another related literature is the one on the implementation of ex-post efficiency. This literature studies whether there exists an interim incentive-compatible mechanism that awards the asset to the player with the highest valuation while satisfying players' interim participation constraints and without incurring a deficit. In the private-value setting, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed that under weak conditions the answer is "no" when the asset is initially owned by one of the players, and Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) showed that the answer is "yes" when players are ex-ante symmetric and the initial shares are sufficiently close to being equal. Environments with interdependent valuations have been studied by Fieseler, Kittsteiner, and Moldovanu (2003), Jehiel and Pauzner (2006) , and Segal and Whinston (2011).
Our paper differs from this literature in two respects. First, because of the reallocation costs, what is ex-post efficient in our model and the maximal expected surplus depend on the initial division and not only on players' valuations. Understanding this dependency is the focus of our paper. Second, the contract in our model is signed at the ex-ante stage, when there is aggregate uncertainty about players' valuations and players have no property rights. Consequently, a deficit can be avoided by having players willingly fund a mechanism that is executed after they obtain their private information.
There is also a finance literature that studies costly reallocation in the context of rebalancing a financial portfolio. Typical models in this literature study dynamic settings in which an investor can frequently rebalance his investments in a risk-free asset and a risky asset whose value is determined by a random process. The transaction costs involved in rebalancing may be proportional (linear), constant, or a fraction of the portfolio value. 3 Our work differs from this literature in two respects. First, because we are interested in understanding the effect of reallocation costs in general, rather than in a particular application, our specification of reallocation costs is richer -and of the rest of the environment is simpler -than in this literature. Second, we study how different forms of reallocation costs influence the connection between the initial division of the asset and the surplus generated by optimally reallocating it, rather than taking the initial division as given (if it is at all relevant) and focusing only on optimal rebalancing.
Contracting environment
Two risk-neutral players with quasi-linear utilities wish to allocate a divisible asset of size 1 between them. At the beginning of stage 0, the players sign a contract that specifies the initial division of the asset, its final allocation, and transfers. The initial division and any stage 0 transfers are then carried out. At this stage players' valuations for the asset are uncertain and are expected to be drawn from a symmetric joint probability distribution. Between stage 0 and stage 1 players' valuations are realized -either publicly or privately. In stage 1, the final allocation is implemented. There is no discounting between periods. 4 
Publicly realized valuations
The contract (  ) specifies the following:
1. A stage 0 initial division  = ( 1 − ) of the asset, where  ∈ [0 1] is player 1's initial share and 1 −  is player 2's initial share.
2. A stage 0 transfer  ∈ R from player 1 to player 2 (if  is negative, then || is transferred from player 2 to player 1).
3. A stage 1 final allocation that specifies, for each public realization (
When the final allocation differs from the initial division, each player may incur reallocation costs. These costs may depend on the amount reallocated and on players' valuations, but not on players' identities. The cost of reallocating an amount ∆  0 from a player with valuation   (the Losing player) to a player with valuation   (the Gaining player) is
to the losing player and
The per-period utility of a player with valuation  from a share  of the asset is . Player 1's expected utility from the initial division and the transfer specified in the contract is ( 1 ) − , where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of players' valuations. Given a realization ( 1   2 ) of players' valuations, player 1's stage 1 utility from the contract is
where the first term is the player's benefit from the final allocation , and the other two terms are the player's cost when he loses
Player 2's expected utility from the contract is defined similarly.
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Because players are ex-ante symmetric, the sum of their expected utilities from the initial division and the transfer,
, does not depend on . We thus ignore this expectation, and refer to the sum of players' stage 1 expected utilities as the expected surplus:
Given a realization of players' valuations we refer to the sum of players' stage 1 utilities as the ex-post surplus. Because any surplus generated by the final allocation can be divided between the players by adjusting the stage 0 transfer, we have the following observation.
Observation 1
The final allocation specified in the contract maximizes the expected surplus relative to the initial division.
One final allocation that maximizes the expected surplus is an -efficient final allocation   , which maximizes the ex-post surplus for any realization ( 1   2 ), that is,
Example 1 illustrates an -efficient final allocation. allocation has a "bang-bang" form. It allocates the entire asset to player 1 if the average benefit of doing so,  1 −  2 , is strictly larger than the average cost, (1 − ) (region 1 in Figure 1 ), and to player 2 if  2 − 1 is strictly larger than  (region 2 in Figure 1 ). Otherwise, it maintains the initial division (region 3 in Figure 1 ). Because   12, we have that min{ (1 − )}  1, so with positive probability the final allocation differs from the initial division.♦ In the setting of Example 1, compare the specified -efficient final allocation to the final allocation that always assigns the entire asset to the player with the higher valuation. First, the -efficient final allocation changes with the initial division. Second, it is not symmetric for  6 = 12. Third, the expected surplus changes with the initial division even when each player's initial share is positive. None of these hold for the final allocation that assigns the entire asset to the player with the higher valuation. 7 When the contract is incomplete in the sense that each player can walk away with his share of the asset at the beginning of stage 1, players can still maximize the expected surplus relative to the initial division. This is because the ex-post surplus in an -efficient final allocation is higher than that in the initial division  for every realization of players' valuations, so the contract can specify stage 1 transfers between the players (that depend on the realized valuations and sum to zero) such that the players agree to the -efficient final allocation. In fact, surplus maximization is achievable even when the contract is incomplete in the sense that it does not specify a final allocation, as long as players can bargain efficiently in stage 1. In this case, the distribution of the ex-post surplus may depend on the initial division of the asset, but anticipating this the players can use the stage 0 transfer  to compensate the player whose stage 1 bargaining position is weaker.
Privately realized valuations
Implementing an -efficient final allocation in stage 1, and hence maximizing the expected surplus relative to the initial division , is also possible when valuations are realized privately. To do this, the contract also specifies: The payments can be thought of as being made to a third party (or received from that party if they are negative). Below we comment on how to overcome the need for a third party.
Implementation requires that: (IC)  Individual Rationality (IR) is relevant when players can walk away with their initial share of the asset at the beginning of stage 1. Budget Balance (BB) guarantees that the players capture the entire surplus from the asset.
The difficulty in guaranteeing (IC) arises because each player's utility may depend on the other player's valuation through the reallocation costs. 8 The following observation, which uses the notion of increasing differences, 9 identifies sufficient conditions on the reallocation cost functions for implementing an -efficient allocation as an ex-post equilibrium. In an ex-post equilibrium, given that the other player reports truthfully, a player prefers to report his valuation truthfully for any valuation of the other player.
Observation 2 For any initial division , an -efficient final allocation is implementable as an ex-post equilibrium if the reallocation cost functions   and   satisfy increasing differences
The conditions in Observation 2 say that the marginal reallocation costs increase in the losing player's valuation and decrease in the gaining player's valuation, both for the gaining player and for the losing player. 8 When this is not the case, a Groves (1973) mechanism can be used to implement an -efficient final allocation in dominant strategies without imposing any conditions on the cost functions. 9 Let  and  be two sets of real numbers. A function  :  ×  → R satisfies (strict) increasing differences
In the Appendix, we show that there exist payment schedules  1 1 and  1 2 that guarantee (IC). These payment schedules can be increased by a constant to guarantee (IR), without affecting players' incentives for truthful revelation. The payments  0 1 and  0 2 can then be chosen to simultaneously guarantee (BB) and divide the surplus between the players. This allows players to overcome any expected deficit that may arise in stage 1 when (IR) is needed. 10 Relaxing (IC) to hold as a Bayesian equilibrium enables achieving ex-post budget balance (rather than ex-ante budget balance). That is, the payment schedules  1 1 and  1 2 can be chosen so that for any realization (
11 In this case, there is no need for a third party to balance the budget ex-post: positive payments  0  are put in a "safe" in stage 0, and payments  To summarize, whether players' valuations are realized publicly or privately, the players can attain the maximal expected surplus relative to the initial division specified in the contract. We therefore proceed to study how the maximal expected surplus changes with the initial division.
Comment. Studying how the maximal expected surplus changes with the initial division is also relevant in single-person settings. In such settings, the asset can be initially allocated between two uses, and   is the surplus generated by allocating  shares of the asset to use . The reallocation costs capture the loss of surplus that arises from reallocating the asset. Maximizing the expected surplus corresponds to maximizing the single-person's expected utility from the asset.
Optimal initial divisions
We first study how the maximal expected surplus changes with the initial division when the reallocation costs are insensitive to the amount reallocated. We then consider costs with either a concave or a convex variable component.
Amount-insensitive reallocation costs
Some reallocation costs do not depend on the amount reallocated. One example is the legal and other fees associated with transferring ownership of a property, which may essentially be the same regardless of how much of the property changes hands. The magnitude of this overhead may be affected by players' valuations when they correspond to the use to which the property is put (residential, commercial, etc.). We denote by (     ) the total amount-insensitive cost of transferring any amount ∆  0 from a player with valuation   to a player with valuation   . Efficiency implies that      .
Let  = ( 1 − ) be some initial division. We first specify an -efficient final allocation, which achieves the maximal expected surplus relative to . For this, we denote by   (     ) the minimal amount for which the benefit of reallocation exceeds the cost:
 allocates the entire asset to the player with the strictly higher valuation if the other player's initial share is strictly larger than   , and otherwise maintains the initial division :
To understand how the maximal expected surplus changes with the initial division, let  0 be an initial division that is more concentrated than , where the concentration of an initial division is the larger share in the division. We now compare the expected surplus in   when the initial division is  with the expected surplus in a "modified" final allocation  0 when the initial division is  0 . The modified final allocation  0 maintains the more concentrated initial division  0 for those realizations for which   maintains , and is otherwise identical to   .
To facilitate the comparison, fix two valuations      and consider the change in the sum of the ex-post surpluses of the two realizations (     ) and (     ). There are three cases to consider. If the concentration of  is smaller than   (     ), then   maintains the initial division  for both realizations, so  0 maintains the initial division  0 for both realizations.
The sum of the ex-post surpluses is then   +   in both final allocations. If the concentration of  is strictly smaller than 1 −   (     ), then   reallocates the asset to the player with valuation   independently of his initial share, and so does  0 . The sum of the ex-post surpluses
Otherwise, the concentration of  is larger than
 reallocates the asset to the player with valuation   if he has the smaller initial share, and maintains the initial division if he has the larger initial share. When   reallocates the asset, moving to  0 and  0 has no effect on the ex-post surplus because the reallocation costs are amount insensitive. But when   maintains the initial division, moving to 12 If  0 ∈ {(0 1) (1 0)}, then the sum increases to
  0 and  0 strictly increases the ex-post surplus because the initial share of the player with the higher valuation is larger in  0 than in . Therefore, the sum of the ex-post surpluses of (     ) and (     ) strictly increases. This implies that if the concentration of  is larger than   for a positive measure of realizations, then moving to  0 and  0 strictly increases the maximal expected surplus. Therefore, letting   = inf{ : There are two reasons why the maximal expected surplus may be constant around the equal initial division. The first is that the reallocation costs may be large relative to the benefit of reallocating half of the asset. When this happens, the initial division is always maintained when it is close to being equal. As the initial concentration increases, the benefit of reallocating to the player with the smaller initial share increases. Once the initial concentration exceeds   , the asset is reallocated to the player with the smaller initial share (but not to the player with the larger initial share), and the maximal expected surplus becomes strictly monotonic in the initial concentration. The second reason is that the reallocation costs may be small relative to the benefit of reallocating half of the asset. When this happens, the asset is always reallocated when the initial division is close to being equal. As the initial concentration increases, the benefit of reallocating to the player with the larger share decreases. Once the initial concentration exceeds 1 −   , the asset is no longer reallocated to the player with the larger initial share (but continues to be reallocated to the player with the smaller initial share), and the maximal expected surplus becomes strictly monotonic in the initial concentration. Example 2 illustrates these two possibilities.
Example 2. Suppose that player 1's valuation is distributed uniformly on [0 13]∪[23 1], that player 2's valuation is  2 = 1 −  1 , and that the reallocation cost is . For   12 the expected surplus is constant around the equal initial division because the benefit of reallocating half of the asset is at most 12, so the asset is never reallocated there. For   16 the expected surplus is constant around the equal initial division because the asset is always reallocated to the player with the higher valuation. This is because the difference between players' valuations is at least 13, so reallocating half of the asset generates a benefit of at least 16. Figure 2 illustrates how the threshold   changes as a function of . When   16, the threshold   decreases in  because the range of initial divisions for which the asset is always reallocated shrinks. When 16 ≤  ≤ 12, the threshold   is constant at 12 because whenever the initial division is not equal there are realizations for which the asset is reallocated to the player with the higher valuation when he has the larger initial share but not when he has the smaller initial share. When   12, the threshold   increases in  because the range of initial divisions for which the asset is never reallocated increases.
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♦ Proposition 1 shows that in the presence of amount-insensitive reallocation costs increasing the concentration of the initial division increases the maximal expected surplus. This is true for any symmetric distribution of players' valuations, and regardless of the magnitude of the reallocation costs.
An immediate implication is that the contract should specify a fully concentrated initial division, in which one player has the entire asset. This initial division is strictly better than any other initial division if and only if there is a positive measure of realizations for which the difference between the players' valuations is strictly larger than the reallocation costs associated with the valuations.
14 In Example 2, this happens if and only if   1, because the maximal difference between players' valuations is 1.
Another implication of Proposition 1 relates to situations in which players are constrained in choosing the initial division but not the final allocation. This happens, for example, when learning one's valuation for the asset requires a positive initial share, or when players have time or other constraints that are likely to be resolved before valuations are realized. In such cases, 13 Formally
14 If the condition holds, then there is an   0 such that there is a positive measure of realizations for which
If the condition does not hold, then for a measure 1 of realizations and any initial division it is optimal to maintain the initial division. the players should specify as concentrated an initial division as possible.
Finally, when the initial division is not constrained, the contract should specify a fully concentrated initial division and a final allocation that either maintains the initial division or reallocates the entire asset to the player with the higher valuation. This implies that ex-post one of the players has the entire asset, which is similar to the final allocation in the setting of Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) , in which reallocation is costless. But in contrast to that setting, the player who ends up with the asset may sometimes be the one with the lower valuation.
Concave reallocation costs
Reallocation costs may have a variable component that is concave in the amount reallocated. As mentioned in the Introduction, this may be the case if reallocation requires learning by the gainer or results in an emotional loss for the loser. The total reallocation cost function is then concave regardless of whether there are also amount-insensitive costs.
Concavity implies that, fixing an initial division , there is an -efficient final allocation   that for any realization of valuations either reallocates the entire asset to the player with the higher valuation or maintains the initial division. This is because the marginal reallocation cost decreases in the amount reallocated, whereas the marginal benefit is constant. In terms of the expected surplus in   , the main difference from the setting with amountinsensitive costs is that increasing the concentration of the initial division increases the cost of reallocating the asset to the player with the higher valuation when he has the smaller initial share. But this increase is offset by the benefit generated when the player with the higher valuation has the larger initial share. To see this, fix two realizations (     ) and (     ), and suppose that in   when the initial division is  the asset is reallocated to the player with the higher valuation when he has the smaller initial share. If the asset is also reallocated to the player with the higher valuation when he has the larger initial share, then concavity implies that the cost decrease that results from increasing the concentration (and using the same final allocation) is larger than the cost increase mentioned above. The other possibility is that the initial division is maintained when the player with the higher valuation has the larger initial share. By concavity, the marginal increase in the reallocation costs mentioned above is smaller than the average reallocation cost; this average reallocation cost is in turn smaller than the average benefit of reallocation,   −   (because   is -efficient); and this average benefit equals the marginal benefit from increasing the concentration when the player with the higher valuation has the larger initial share and the more concentrated initial division is maintained. Therefore, letting   (formally defined in the Appendix) denote the smallest share for which the expected benefit of increasing the concentration is strictly larger than the expected cost, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2
The maximal expected surplus increases in the concentration of the initial divi-sion. The increase is strict if and only if the initial concentration is larger than   . Propositions 1 and 2 extend to environments with more than two periods in which players' valuations in each period are drawn independently from their valuations in previous periods and the asset can be reallocated after each period's valuations are realized. Maximizing the (possibly discounted) sum of the expected surpluses across periods can be done as follows. Allocate the entire asset initially to a single player, and in each period, based on players' realized valuations, either do nothing or reallocate the entire asset to the other player. This maximizes the perperiod surplus, because the entire asset is allocated to a single player at the beginning of every period, before the valuations for that period are realized. And the sum of expected surpluses cannot exceed what is obtained by maximizing the per-period expected surplus.
Proposition 2 may hint at how to assign ownership when players are loss averse. More concretely, suppose that a player views his initial share as a reference point, and experiences a mental loss when his final share is smaller than this reference point. 15 According to Kahneman and Tversky (1991), the marginal sensitivity to losses decreases in the amount lost, so reallocation costs are concave. Proposition 2 then shows that the players should initially allocate the asset to a single player, who will transfer ownership to the other player ex-post if the other player's valuation is sufficiently higher than his. 16 This continues to hold if the initial division is instead determined by a planner who seeks to maximize players' sum of expected utilities. For example, when parents wish to divide family assets among their children, they may be concerned that any future reallocation of the assets may result in mental losses to the children whose shares in a particular asset decrease. In this case, the parents should concentrate the ownership of each asset in the hands of one child, and can preserve equality by allocating additional monetary assets.
Convex reallocation costs
Unlike with mental losses, variable reallocation costs are often convex in the amount reallocated. As discussed in the Introduction, this is the case when players have the flexibility to reallocate the least costly units first.
Convexity implies that it is generally not ex-post efficient either to reallocate the entire asset to one player or to maintain the initial division. Moreover, unlike with concave variable costs, the qualitative relationship between the initial division and the maximal expected surplus depends on the magnitude of the amount-insensitive costs. We first consider convex variable costs without an amount-insensitive component, and then add this component.
With no amount-insensitive costs, the total cost function (      ∆) is convex in the amount reallocated. To understand how the maximal expected surplus changes with the initial division, fix two realizations, (     ) and (     ), and compare the sums of the ex-post surpluses of these realizations in two efficient final allocations that correspond to two initial divisions, with the second initial division being less concentrated than the first. These sums differ in the following two cases, which depend on how players' initial shares compare to the optimal unconstrained amount that would be reallocated to the player with the higher valuation if the other player initially had the entire asset. 17 In the simple case in which the larger share in the first initial division is smaller than the optimal unconstrained amount, the entire asset is allocated to the player with the higher valuation in both final allocations, independently of his initial share. Convexity then implies that the sum of the ex-post surpluses is higher in the final allocation that corresponds to the less concentrated initial division. Now suppose that the optimal unconstrained amount is between the smaller and larger shares in the first initial division. In this case, this optimal amount is reallocated to the player with the higher valuation if he has the smaller initial share, and the entire asset is allocated to the player with the higher valuation if he has the larger initial share. The same is true when the initial division is slightly less concentrated. Relative to the more concentrated initial division, the reallocation costs increase when the player with the higher valuation has the larger initial share, and the ex-post surplus increases when the player with the higher valuation has the smaller initial share. The former increase is smaller than the latter because the smaller share in the first initial division is smaller than the optimal unconstrained amount.
Therefore, letting   (formally defined in the Appendix) denote the smallest share for which the expected benefit of decreasing the concentration is strictly larger than the expected cost, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3
The maximal expected surplus decreases in the concentration of the initial division. The decrease is strict if and only if the initial concentration is larger than   . Propositions 2 and 3 have different predictions about the optimal initial division of assets in the presence of reallocation costs. Whereas concave costs push toward concentrated initial divisions, convex costs push toward an equal initial division. This qualitative difference is robust to the magnitude of the reallocation costs, how the costs depend on valuations, and the distrib-ution of valuations. The boundary case is linear reallocation costs (with no amount-insensitive costs), in which the maximal expected surplus does not depend on the initial division.
Propositions 1 and 3 also have different predictions about the optimal initial division: amountinsensitive costs push toward a concentrated initial division, whereas convex variable costs push toward an equal initial division. When both costs are present and each player has only two possible valuations      , one of the costs dominates, so an optimal initial division is either a fully concentrated one or the equal one. To understand which of them is optimal, denote by    (     ) the maximal surplus that can be generated by transferring up to  shares from a player with valuation   to a player with valuation   when ignoring amount-insensitive costs, that is,
where   denotes the variable convex costs. We then have the following result.
Observation 3 If the amount-insensitive costs are higher than 2
, then the expected surplus is maximized at the fully concentrated initial divisions. If the amountinsensitive costs are lower than 2
, then the expected surplus is maximized at the equal initial division.
Convexity implies that 2
, so the equal initial division is optimal for low amount-insensitive costs, and the fully concentrated ones are optimal for high amountinsensitive costs. Variable reallocation costs that are linear in the amount reallocated have 2 12  =  1  , so with amount-insensitive costs the only optimal initial divisions are the fully concentrated ones. 18 Observation 3 clearly extends to the case in which players have more than two valuations, provided that its conditions hold for a measure 1 of realizations. This implies that a sufficient condition for the fully concentrated initial divisions to be optimal is that the amount-insensitive costs are always larger than  12  , because  1  is always larger than  12  . In general, however, when each player has more than two possible valuations it may be that neither the equal initial division nor the fully concentrated ones are optimal. Moreover, in contrast to the case of two possible valuations, the optimal initial concentration need not increase in the magnitude of the amount-insensitive costs. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3. Suppose that each player has three possible valuations, 0, 54, and 2, that the distribution of players' valuations is uniform over the four realizations (0 54)  (54 0)  (0 2), and (2 0), that the variable cost is ∆ 2 , and that the amount-insensitive cost is 38. The top left panel of Figure 3 depicts how the sum of surpluses of the realizations (0 2) and (2 0) changes with the initial concentration. This sum is maximized at the equal initial division. The top right panel of Figure 3 shows that the sum of surpluses of the realizations (0 54) and (54 0) is maximized at the fully concentrated initial divisions. The aggregate expected surplus, depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 3 , is maximized at the initial divisions with concentration 1324. The optimal initial concentration is not monotonic in the amount-insensitive cost, because for amount-insensitive costs of 0 and 2564 the optimal initial concentration is 12.♦
Concluding remarks
This paper studied how to initially divide an asset when reallocation is costly. The main takeaway from our analysis is that reallocation costs affect the optimal initial division of assets in a systematic way. When reallocation costs are amount insensitive or concave, as may be the case with ownership transfer and workload reassignment, the more concentrated the initial division the larger the expected surplus. When reallocation costs are convex, the more concentrated the initial division the smaller the expected surplus. We conclude with possible modifications of our symmetry and two-player assumptions.
Asymmetric Players. The symmetry assumption allowed us to isolate the effect of the reallocation costs on the optimal initial division. When players are asymmetric, the asymmetry interacts with the reallocation costs to determine the optimal initial division. One possible asymmetry is in the distribution of players' valuations. Suppose, for example, that for any pair of possible valuations player 1's valuation is likely to be higher than player
where  is the density of the distribution of valuations. In this case, comparing two initial divisions with the same concentration, the maximal expected surplus is larger when player 1 has the larger initial share than when player 2 does, for any reallocation costs. This implies that in any optimal initial division player 1 has the larger initial share. When reallocation costs are amount insensitive or concave, the forces identified in the proof of Proposition 2 continue to hold, so the optimal initial division assigns the entire asset to player 1. When reallocation costs are convex, the asymmetry implies that the equal division is no longer optimal, and that in the optimal initial division player 1's share is strictly larger than player 2's share. This is true independently of the stage 0 expected surplus, which also pushes toward a higher initial share for player 1.
Another possible asymmetry is in the reallocation costs. Suppose, for example, that the marginal cost of reallocating shares from player 2 to player 1 is higher than in the other direction. That is, if   (      ∆) is the total cost of transferring ∆ shares from player  with valuation   to player  6 =  with valuation   , then for any
Then the same conclusions hold as in the case of asymmetric valuations.
More than two players. Extending our analysis to   2 players requires a more general notion of concentration. Given two initial divisions  = ( 1        ) and  = ( 1        ), we say than  is more concentrated than  if  majorizes  , that is, if when the shares in  and in  are arranged in decreasing order, we have that
In settings with two players, majorization induces a complete ordering on the set of initial divisions. With three or more players, the induced ordering is a partial one. Assuming that the reallocation costs are additive across reallocations, and that the costs of each reallocation depend only on the amount reallocated and on the valuations of the gaining player and the losing player, we obtain the following generalization of our results.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that  is more concentrated than  . Then, (1) If the reallocation costs are amount insensitive or concave in the amount reallocated, then the maximal expected surplus associated with  is higher than that associated with  .
(2) If the reallocation costs are convex in the amount reallocated, then the maximal expected surplus associated with  is higher than that associated with .
In particular, because the initial divisions that assign the asset to a single player majorize every other initial division, they are optimal when the reallocation costs are amount insensitive or concave. And because the equal initial division is majorized by every other initial division, this division is optimal when the reallocation costs are convex.
Appendix
Proof of Observation 2. We demonstrate that there exists a payment schedule  1 1 (· ·) that supports ex-post incentive compatibility for player 1; the treatment of player 2 is analogous. (IR) and (BB) can then be satisfied, as shown in Section 2.2.
By part (a) of Lemma 2 in Segal and Whinston (2011), a sufficient condition is that (1)   ( 1   2 ) increases in  1 for every  2 , and (2) ( 1   2   ) satisfies increasing differences in ( 1  ) for every  2 and . For (1), fix  2 and consider valuations  1 ≥  2 , which implies that
maximizes the sum of the players' utilities (surplus), we can apply Topkis's (1998) theorem 2.8.7 to show that   ( 1   2 ) increases in  1 . For this it suffices to show that
For (2) , suppose that  is in [ 1], and hence (
we are done. A similar argument applies to  in [0 ]. Finally, consider  0 and  such that
To show that the expression increases in  1 , it suffices to show that
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. We first formally define the threshold   . We then observe that Proposition 1 is a corollary of Proposition 2. We then prove Proposition 2.
be the total reallocation cost function, where   is concave in ∆. For every two valuations      , let   (     ) denote the minimal share that is worth transferring, i.e.,
denote the largest number  such that the total reallocation cost function is linear in the amount reallocated in the interval
Then,
Proposition 1 is a corollary of proposition 2, because when costs are amount insensitive,   (     ) = 1, and the definition of   for concave costs coincides with the definition of   for amount-insensitive costs.
We now prove Proposition 2. Suppose that the larger share in the initial division , denoted by  max , is smaller than 1. Consider the -efficient final allocation   given by (1) and in the modified final allocation with a higher initial concentration. There are three cases:
, then the initial division is maintained for both realizations, so the sum is   +   in both final allocations.
If
, then the player with   gets the entire asset in both realizations, so the sum in
, and in the modified final allocation with a higher concentration  max +  it is
The second sum is larger than the first by concavity of  (      ·). The sums are equal for small   0 if and only if  max    (     ).
, then the player with   gets the entire asset if his initial share is 1 −  max and otherwise the initial division is maintained, so the sum in 
, and in the modified final allocation with a higher initial concentration  max +  it is
The second sum is larger than the first if and only if
This inequality holds because
where the first inequality follows from  max ≥   (     ) and the second inequality follows from the concavity of  (      ·). One of the inequalities holds strictly. Otherwise, if the second inequality is an equality then
If, in addition, the first inequality holds as an equality, then by definition
Moreover, cases 1 and 3 show that if 
, then if we use the modified final allocation with an initial concentration lower than  max , the sum does not change. 21 So the sum in an  max -efficient allocation as
Proof of Proposition 3. Denote by
}} the optimal unconstrained amount, and let
where   is defined as in the previous proof. Then,
Consider an initial division  with  max  12, where  max is the larger share in . Let  − be an initial division with concentration  max −  for a small   0. For any      , it is easy to see that it is optimal to reallocate min {   (     )} of the asset to the player with   , where  is the initial share of the player with   . Therefore, the following final allocation   is -efficient:
.
Choose two valuations      , and compare the sum of the ex-post surpluses of the two realizations (     ) and (     ) in   with the initial division  and in   − with the initial division  − . There are three cases:
The second sum is larger than the first by convexity of  (      ·). The sums are equal if and only if
, then the player with valuation   is reallocated   (     ) in both realizations, so the sums are equal.
, then the player with   gets the entire asset if his initial share is  max , and otherwise he is reallocated
and similarly in   − . The sum of surpluses is larger in   − if and only if
This inequality holds strictly, because    1− max implies that after reallocating 1− max shares to the player with valuation   , the benefit of reallocating an additional  is strictly larger than the cost of doing so.
This shows that slightly decreasing the initial concentration increases the sum of the maximal ex-post surpluses for the two realizations (     ) and (     ). Because this sum is continuous in the initial concentration, 22 the sum decreases in the initial concentration on the interval [12 1].
To identify where the decrease is strict, suppose first that   (     ) ≥ 12. Then cases 1 and 3 show that the sum strictly decreases if and only if
, then cases 2 and 3 show that the sum strictly decreases if and only if
Proof of Observation 3. If both players have the same valuation, the asset is not reallocated. We therefore focus on the two realizations (     ) and (     ). We first show that the sum of the ex-post surpluses for these realizations is maximized in either a fully concentrated initial division or the equal one. Denote by  0 (     ) the minimal unconstrained share for which reallocation is beneficial, that is,
and  0 (     ) = 1 if this set is empty. Fix some initial division . Suppose first that the smaller initial share in  is larger than  0 . In this case, reallocating some of the asset to the player with the higher valuation is beneficial independently of his initial share. Because the variable reallocation cost is convex, the arguments developed for Proposition 3 show that the sum of the ex-post surpluses is larger in the equal initial division than in . Now suppose that the smaller initial share is smaller than  0 . In this case, the initial division  is maintained when the player with the lower valuation has the smaller initial share. The sum of ex-post surpluses is   +   plus any additional benefit generated by reallocating shares to the player with the higher valuation when he has the smaller initial share. This additional benefit increases in the concentration because more of the asset can be transferred to this player. For the first statement in the proposition, suppose that
If the initial division is maintained, the sum of the ex-post surpluses for the two realizations is   +   . Consider the following cases:
, then an efficient final allocation for an equal initial division is to maintain the initial division. In a fully concentrated initial division, maintaining the initial division gives the same sum of ex-post surpluses, so the sum in an efficient final allocation is larger.
, then the sum of the ex-post surpluses in an efficient final allocation for the equal initial division is
, and for a fully concentrated one is
, which is larger by assumption.
For the second statement in the proposition, suppose that
This implies that (2) . The result now follows as in case 2 above.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof requires the following definition. For any two players, we say that the concentration of the two players increases (decreases), if some of the initial share of the player with the lower (higher) initial share is added to the initial share of the player with the higher (lower) initial share. We refer to this process as increasing (decreasing) the concentration of the two players. If  majorizes  , then by Lemma 2 on page 47 of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1952) there exists a finite sequence of initial divisions Proof. Because the marginal cost of reallocating decreases in the amount reallocated, we consider an efficient final allocation in which if for a given realization of valuations some amount is transferred from player  to player , then player 's entire initial share is transferred to player . Without loss of generality consider players 1 and 2, some realization of all players' valuations, and the realization in which  1 and  2 are reversed. Suppose that
23 Consider the sum of the ex-post surpluses associated with the two realizations of players' valuations in the efficient final allocation. In this sum, consider the sum of surpluses associated with shares  1 and  2 that are initially assigned to the player with valuation   . We now show that this sum increases if the concentration of players 1 and 2 increases and a modified final allocation is implemented, which transfers the entire share of player  to player  when the original efficient final allocation does so, and otherwise maintains the new initial division (the same argument applies to the sum of the surpluses associate with shares  1 and  2 that are initially assigned to the player with valuation   , which concludes the proof). There are three cases:
1. The initial share of the player with valuation   is not reallocated whether it is  1 or  2 . Then, the sum equals ( 1 +  2 )   in both final allocations.
2. The initial share of the player with valuation   is reallocated to a player with valuation     when the initial share is  1 , but not when it is  2 . Then, the sum is
Because the initial share  1 is reallocated, we have  1 − (    1 ) ≥  1   , or equivalently  1 ( −   ) ≥  (    1 ), which together with the concavity of  (   ·) implies that for 23 An almost identical proof applies when   =   .
positive  ≤  2 we have  ( −   ) ≥  (    1 + ) −  (    1 ). This last inequality implies that the sum in the modified final allocation satisfies
3. The initial share of the player with valuation   is reallocated to a player with valuation     when the initial share is  1 , and to a player with valuation    when the initial share is  2 ( may or may not equal). Then, the sum is
To show that this sum increases if the concentration of players 1 and 2 increases, it suffices to show that the marginal value of  at  1 is higher than that of  at  2 . Suppose this is not the case. First note that  ( 2 ) ≤  ( 2 ), otherwise it would have been better to reallocate the initial share  2 to the player with valuation instead of to the player with valuatioñ . Now, because the marginal values of  and  increase from  2 to  1 (reallocation costs are concave), and the marginal value of  at  1 is strictly lower than than of  at  2 (our assumption), we have that the marginal value of  at  is strictly lower than that of  at  for every  in [ 2   1 ]. Together with  ( 2 ) ≤  ( 2 ) this implies that  ( 1 )   ( 1 ). But then it would have been better to reallocate the initial share  1 to the player with valuation instead of to the player with valuation.
Note that there is no "Case 4," because if  2 is reallocated when it is the initial share of the player with valuation   , then by concavity of the costs  1 is reallocated when it is the initial share of the player with valuation   .
Lemma 2 If the reallocation costs are convex in the amount reallocated, then decreasing the concentration of any two players increases the maximal expected surplus.
Proof. Without loss of generality consider players 1 and 2, some realization of all players' valuations, and the realization in which  1 and  2 are reversed. Suppose that  1   2 , where   is player 's initial share. Let   = min { 1   2 } and   = max { 1   2 }, with      . Consider the set of sequences that maximize the ex-post surplus generated by optimally reallocating  shares that were initially allocated to the player with valuation   , arg max
and let   () be the maximal sequence ( 1        ) in this set according to the lexicographic order (that is, for any other sequence ( 1        ) in the set, if there is some  ≤  such that      , then there is some    such that      ). Consider the sum of the ex-post surpluses associated with the two realizations of players' valuations in some efficient final allocation. In this sum, consider the sum of surpluses associated with shares  1 and  2 that are initially assigned to the player with valuation   . This sum is given by the expression in the curly brackets in (3) with ( 1        ) given by   ( 1 ) plus the same expression with ( 1        ) given by   ( 2 ). We now show that this sum increases if the concentration of players 1 and 2 decreases, so that   ( 1 ) is replaced with   ( 1 − ) and   ( 2 ) is replaced with   ( 2 + ) for some small   0 (an almost identical argument applies to the sum of the surpluses associated with shares  1 and  2 that are initially assigned to the player with valuation   , which concludes the proof). Fix some    1 −  2 . By the definition of   and the convexity of the reallocation costs, for every , the  th coordinate of   ( 2 + ) is larger than the  th coordinate of   ( 2 ) by some   ≥ 0, with P  =1   = . The increase in the surplus associated with share  2 that is initially assigned to the player with valuation   resulting from changing   ( 2 ) to   ( 2 + ) is
where   is the  th coordinate of   ( 2 ). The expression (4) is larger than 
